

OCT 2 8 2005 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Serial: HNP-05-113 10 CFR 50.73

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 <u>LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2002-004-09</u>

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) 2002-004-09 is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. This report is a revision to a previously submitted LER that describes an unanalyzed condition due to inadequate separation of associated circuits. Previous revisions to this report, LER 2002-004-00, submitted on February 18, 2003; LER 2002-004-01, submitted on March 26, 2003; LER 2002-004-02, submitted on September 19, 2003; LER 2002-004-03, submitted on April 12, 2004; LER 2002-004-04, submitted on October 12, 2004; LER 2002-004-05, submitted on November 15, 2004; LER 2002-004-06, submitted on December 20, 2004; LER 2002-004-07, submitted on March 21, 2005; and LER 2002-004-08, submitted on September 20, 2005, described similar unanalyzed conditions. The revised information includes an additional condition in a previously identified fire area.

Corrective actions underway in response to the previously identified conditions include a validation of the safe shutdown analysis. This validation is a detailed analysis of the routing of cables affecting equipment credited in response to a fire. The commitments and associated completion dates identified in Section VI remain the same. Similar to the previous revision, the new condition identified by this revision of the LER is targeted for completion by Refueling Outage (RFO) 16 (currently scheduled for November 05, 2010). Compensatory actions, including fire watches, ensure safety pending permanent resolution of the identified conditions.

Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Dave Corlett, Supervisor – Licensing/Regulatory Programs, at (919) 362-3137.

Sincerely,

Eric McCartney Plant General Manager Harris Nuclear Plant

EAM/jpy

Enclosure

Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. Harris Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562

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c: Mr. R. A. Musser (HNP Senior NRC Resident) Mr. C. P. Patel (NRC-NRR Project Manager) Dr. W. D. Travers (NRC Regional Administrator, Region II)

| Enclosure | to | HNP | -05-113 | \$ |
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| the NRC will be used to restore compliance. | | | ll be use | ed to r | estore | e com | pliance. | | | | | | | | | | ECYCLED | | |

| Enclosure to HNP-05-113 | | | | | | | |
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| LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) | | | | | | | |
| 1. FACILITY NAME | 2. DOCKET | 6 | . LER NUMBER | | | 3. PAGE | E |
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| 17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional co | pies of NRC Form | 366A) | | | | | |
| I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT | | | | | | | |
| The Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) discover redundant components credited by the S December 20, 2002 and reported in LER describes another condition, which was di another condition, which was discovered condition, which was discovered on Au this LER describes additional conditions, Revision 6 to this LER describes addition and October 29, 2004. Revision 7 to this January 18, 2005. Revision 9 to this L August 30, 2005. On December 20, 2002, with the Unit in I (HNP) Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA) in areas, the design and compensatory acti equipment would remain available. Spec spurious actuation of components potent [CB-P] or loss of Reactor Coolant Pump - postulated to cause spurious closure of v implementation of the preplanned actions protected CSIP if it was in service at the cause spurious closure of valves in the flit thermal barrier heat exchangers, resulting the SSA for RCP cooling. On January 29, 2003, with the Unit in Mo opening of multiple valves could result in BQ-TKJ inventory to the containment reci concern. On July 23, 2003, with the Unit in Mode 1 valves could result in transferring of RWS watch was already posted in fire areas of related issues, and the fire watch remains validation of the HNP safe shutdown anal the previously reported conditions. | afe Shutdown A 2002-004-00, o discovered on Ja on July 23, 200 uary 13, 2004. Igust 13, Septer which were dis hal conditions, w ER describes add ER describes add ER describes add ER describes add ions credited by cifically, the insp ially resulting in (RCP) [AB-P] so valves in the flow s designed to pr time of the post owpath of Com g in loss of flow de 1 at 100% powe fronsering of I rculation sump. | Analysis (SS dated Febru anuary 29, 03. Revision 4 mber 14, ar covered on which were additional litional conc n additional better additional cover, insection iter SSA we bection ider loss of the eal cooling wpaths for the eal cooling wpaths for the cover, HNP Refueling W A roving fill r, HNP ider the containsection comped discovery o | SA). This con Jary 18, 2003. 2003. Revision on 3 to this LER to this LER den d September 1 discovered on conditions, which y ditions, which y l condition, which spection of the tor postulated yould not ensu- ntified that pose charging/Saf credited by the before postulated yould not ensu- tified that pose charging/Saf credited by the before postulated yould not ensu- tified that pose credited by the before post- the protected C se flowpaths, i Similarly, the bling Water (Co ermal barrier h identified that spu- ment recircula- ensatory action of an old design | dition was Revision on 2 to this R describes escribes a 15, 2004. 5 and Oct October 2 nich were were discu- nich were were discu- nich was d Harris Nu d fires in the re a prote tulated fire tulated fire e SSA. T CSIP, prio resulting in fires were CW) [CC] neat excha simultane Tank (RW been post urious ope tion sump is for othe n issue was | s disco 1 to th s LER (addition Revis. ober 4 20, Oci discove uclear I hree S: cted tra- es coul on Pur he fires r to n loss of eous sp /ST) [E ed in fi ning of A rover as mad | vered o is LER describe her ial ion 5 to , 2004, tober 26 ered on on July red on Plant SA fire ain of d cause np (CSI s were of the lated to RCP credited burious E-, BP- re areas certain ving fire shutdov e during | es 5, 7 22 P) d by , & s of vn g |

| Enclos | ure to HNP-05-113 | | | | | | | |
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| 17. NAR | RATIVE (If more space is required, use additional co | pies of NRC Form | 366A) | | | | | |
| 1. | DESCRIPTION OF EVENT (Continued) | | | | | | | |
| | On February 13, 2004, with the Unit in M where spurious actuation of multiple valv postulated fire and in transferring of RWS of concern are protected by detection and watch already posted as interim compens watch remains posted. These additional previously reported conditions (reference previous discoveries, the discovery on Fe review of the HNP safe shutdown program corrective actions to the previously report On August 13, September 14, and Septe identified that spurious opening of multipl the time of the postulated fire. A roving fi compensatory actions for other safe shut discoveries are old design issues that we This review and other validations are being | es could result ST inventory to 6 d suppression s satory actions for fire areas were e December 20, ebruary 13, 200 m. This review ted conditions. mber 15, 2004, le valves could ire watch was a down related is per identified du | in loss of the the contain systems, ar or other sat inadverter 2002 and 4, is an old and other with the U potentially lready posi- sues, and the ring a revie | the CSIP in service of the control o | vice at the tion sump the path o lated issu- ing the im- discoverie that was id being per that was id being per that 100% pr ss of the 0 s of conce remains pr safe shute | e time c b. The of a rov les. Th vestiga s). Sin dentifie formed ower, F CSIP in ern as i osted. down p | of the fire area ing fire tion for nilar to d durin d as INP service interim These rogram | the the g a e at |
| | conditions. On September 15, 2004, with the Unit in multiple valves could potentially result in Additionally, HNP identified that spurious Spray (CT) pump [BE-P] could potentially October 4, 2004, with the Unit in Mode 1 valve could potentially result in the loss of identified that a postulated fire could resu- range pressure transmitters [AB-PT] crea- already posted in these fire areas of cond- related issues, and the fire watch remains- identified during a review of the HNP safe being performed as corrective actions to On October 20, 26, and 29, 2004, with the additional SSA fire areas and discoveries reported in five previously identified SSA multiple components that could potentiall reported conditions. A roving fire watch y compensatory actions for other safe shut is closed during normal operations. Addi- performed to ensure that no in situ ignitio- area. For the other areas, the fire watch identified during a review of the HNP safe | the loss of the (valve opening) result in the tra at 100% power of RCP seal coo ult in a loss of in dited to monitor cern as interim (s posted. These e shutdown pro- the previously r the previously r the previously r the previously r the areas. The y result in Mode s of components fire areas. The y result in mal- was already pos- down related is tional walkdown on sources and remains posted | CSIP in ser concurrent ansfer of th , HNP iden ling credite dication of RCS press compensat e discoveri gram. This eported co 6 at 0% po se discove operation o sted in thes sues, exce ns of fire ar no intervent. These di | vice at the time with spurious a e RWST inven tified that spur d by the SSA. both Reactor (oure and level. ory actions for es are old desi detailed revier nditions. wer, HNP iden ations of comp ries included s f components a f components a e fire areas of pt for fire area ea 1-C in the a ing or transien scoveries are | e of the po start of a o tory to co ious closu Additiona Coolant S A roving other safe ign issues w and oth tified disc concern a similar to concern a 1-C since area of int t combus old design | ostulate Contair ntainm ire of a ally, HN ystem fire wa e shutce that we er valid overies ot previou as inter e the cc erest w tibles w | ed fire. Inment ent. Or certain NP (RCS) witch was lown vere dations s in four iously n of usly im ontainm vere vere in to s that without the s that the s that the s that the s that the s that the s that | n wide s are ent |

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| LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) | | | | | | |
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| 17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional co | pies of NRC Form | 866A) | | | | |
| I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT (Continued) | | | | | | |
| On January 18, 2005, with the Unit in Mo SSA fire areas and discoveries of compo eight previously identified SSA fire areas, components that could potentially result i conditions. A roving fire watch was alrea actions for other safe shutdown related is design issues that were identified during and other validations are being performer. On July 22 and August 4, 2005, with the components or combinations of compone areas. These discoveries included a pote which may not be feasible due to the pre- conditions by a postulated fire in the area already posted in these fire areas of cond related issues, and the fire watch remains identified during a review of the HNP safe being performed as corrective actions to On August 30, 2005, with the Unit in Mod previously reported in a previously identifi cooling to a room, which could potentially conditions. A roving fire watch was alrea actions for other safe shutdown related is design issue that was identified during a and other validations are being performer. These findings of unanalyzed conditions systems, structures, or components were the event. The previous four SSA fire areas identifief 1. 1-A-BAL-C, located in the RAB Elevation 3. 1-A-EPA, located in the RAB Elevation 4. 1-A-EPB, located in the RAB Elevation 4. 1-A-EPB, located in the RAB Elevation 4. 1-A-CSRA, located in the RAB Elevation 5. 1-A-CSRB, located in the RAB Elevation 6. 1-A-CSRB, located in the RAB Elevation 7. 1-A-CSRC1, located in the RAB Elevatio 7. 1-A-CSRC1, | nents or combin These discover in mal-operation dy posted in the ssues, and the f a review of the d as corrective a Unit in Mode 1 a ents not previou ential loss of co sence of postula a (similar to previously r de 1 at 100% po the previously r de 1 at 100% po fied SSA fire are y affect equipment dy posted in the ssues, and the f review of the Hill d as corrective a are being report in included: uxiliary Building ation 286' cal Penetration F cal Penetration F cal Penetration F cal S6' cal 286' cal 286' | ations of components no eries included spurious a of components similar to see fire areas of concern re watch remains posted HNP safe shutdown prog actions to the previously at 100% power, HNP idea sly reported in two previously reported in two previously at 100% power, HNP idea sly reported in two previously at 100% power, HNP idea sly reported in two previously reported conditions for a discoveries are old des gram. This detailed revie eported conditions. wer, HNP identified a dis trans. This discovery includ and credited in the SSA si a fire area of concern as actions to the previously the pursuant to 10 CFR she time of discovery that (RAB) Elevations 261' an action "A" Elevation 261' actions "B" Elevation 261' | ot previous ctuation of previous as interim these d ram. This reported c ously ident a manual rom dama is). A rovii other safe ign issues w and oth covery of ed the pot milar to pr interim con the pot contrained c 50.73(a)(2 significant and 286' | sly report f multip ly report competision iliscove s detailed onditio coverie ified SS operato ge und that we er valic a comp ential I evious mpensa covery letailed onditio)(ii)(B). | orted in le rted ensatory ries are ed revie ns. s of SA fire or actior er certa watch w own ere lations a ponent r oss of ly report atory is an ol review ns. | vold w in vas are not ted d |

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| 17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional co | opies of NRC Form | 366A) | | | - | | |
| 1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT (Continued) | | | | | | | |
| The discoveries on August 13, Septembolive previously identified SSA fire areas: 1-A-BAL-B, located in the RAB Elevia 1-A-EPA, located in the RAB Elevia 1-A-CSRA, located in the RAB Elevia 1-A-CSRB, located in the RAB Elevia 1-A-SWGRA, located in the RAB Elevia 1-A-SWGRB, located in the RAB Elevia 1-A-BAL-C, located in the RAB Elevia 1-A-BAL-C, located in the RAB Elevia 1-A-BAL-C, located in the RAB Elevia 1-A-CSRA, located in the RAB Elevia 1-A-CSRB, located in the RAB Elevia 1-A-BAL-C, located in the RAB Elevia 1-A-BAL-C, located in the RAB Elevia 1-A-EPA, located in the RAB Elevia 1-A-CSRA, located in the RAB Elevia 1-A-EPA, located in the RAB Elevia 1-A-CSRA, located in the RAB Elevia 1-A-CS | ations 261' and 2 ation 286' cal Penetration I ation 286' ation 286' actober 4, 2004 if ations 261' and 2 ations 261' and 2 ations 190', 216 evation 286' evation 286' evation 261' aber 29, 2004 inter- solution 286' evation 261' ation 286' cal Penetration I ation 286' cal Penetration I ation 286' cal Penetration I ation 286' ation 286' atio | 286' Room "A" El ncluded new 286'. entified the f ', 236', and 3 cluded new A fire areas: 286' Room "A" El ving two add 5' components | evation 261' w components following four 261' components of evation 261' ditional SSA fi | s in the fol additional or combina | llowing | two re area | s: |
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| LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) | | | | | | |
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| 17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional co | ples of NRC Form | 366A) | | | | |
| I. <u>DESCRIPTION OF EVENT (Continued)</u> | | | | | | |
| The discoveries on July 22 and August 4, the following two previously identified SS/ 1. 1-A-BAL-A, located in the RAB Eleva 2. 1-A-BAL-B, located in the RAB Eleva | A fire areas: ation 236' ation 261' | | | | | |
| The discovery on August 30, 2005 include area: | ed a new comp | onent in the following prev | iously ide | entified | SSA fi | ire |
| 1. 1-A-CSRA, located in the RAB Elevat | tion 286' | | | | | |
| The specific conditions for each of the fire identified above, as applicable based on t | | | | | | low. |
| For a postulated fire in SSA fire areas 1-A two outlet valves (1CS-165 or 1CS-166) of thermal barriers (1CC-207), the outlet isoli injection to the Reactor Coolant System (spurious actuation in accordance with the Position CMEB 9.5-1) Section C.5.b. Spe Operated Valve (MOV) [20] 1CS-165 and A-BAL-B and 1-A-EPA with no fire barrier MOVs 1SI-4, 1SI-52, and 1SI-107 are rou- barrier. In addition, the control power cab foot above its Motor Control Center (MCC Therefore, the unprotected cables for these system valves are required to remain ope these fire areas. As a result, a fire in any outlet valves, loss of suction flow to the ru- by the SSA for charging flow and RCP se provide CCW flow to RCP thermal barrier result in spurious closure of this valve and the SSA for RCP seal cooling. The safety this area resulting in spurious opening of run out conditions. Simultaneous spuriou component cooling water system could re seal loss of coolant accident (LOCA) with For a postulated fire in SSA fire area 1-A- return valve from RCP thermal barriers (1 coolers (1CC-208) are not protected from 0800, Attachment 1 (Branch Technical Pc cables for the CCW system MOVs 1CC-2 into their MCC in this area with no fire bar | of the Volume (lation valve (15 (RCS) isolation e requirements ecifically, the co d CCW system r. Similarly, the uted through SS ble for charging C) [MCC] and in the MOVs are v en to provide CS of these areas unning CSIP, and the exchange d loss of flow to y injection system multiple valves us actuation of re- solut or edited CS -BAL-C (286' el 1CC-251) and the n spurious actuato osition CMEB 9 251 and 1CC-20 | Control Tank (VCT), the CO SI-4) of the Boron Injection valves (1SI-52 and 1SI-10 of NUREG 0800, Attachmo ontrol power cables for cha MOV 1CC-207 are routed control power cables for sis SA fire areas 1-A-BAL-B are system MOV 1CS-166 is uninerable to fire-induced h SIP suction from the VCT of could result in spurious cl nd subsequent damage to e CCW system valve is reco ers. As a result, a postulat o RCP thermal barrier heat em valves are normally clo could result in damage to multiple valves in the charg ation of the RCP seals, pos SIPs. | CW suppl Tank (BI 7) are no ent 1 (Bra arging sys through \$ safety injend 1-A-EF unprotect rea 1-A-EF unprotect of shorts. during a p osure of the runni quired to n exchang used, so a the runn ging syste ssibly lead r cables f CP seals e require ifically, the fire area | ly valve IT), and ot prote- anch Te stem M SSA fire- ection s PA with- ted for BAL-B. . The c postula one of ing CSI remain this ar gers creation a postul ing CSI em and ding to for the e a and me encode a nd me encode a 1-A-B. | e to RCI d the sa icted fro echnica- lotor e areas system n no fire about c charging ted fire the VC ² IP credi open to rea coul edited b lated fir IP due b lated fir IP due the an RCI otor of NUR rol power | P afety om al al a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a |
| vulnerable to fire-induced hot shorts. The flow to RCP thermal barrier heat exchang spurious closure of these valves and loss SSA for RCP seal cooling. However, RC of the redundant charging/safety injection | gers. As a resu s of flow to RCP P seals would s | It, a postulated fire in this a thermal barrier heat exch | area coul angers ci | ld resul redited | t in by the | |

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| 17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional co | opies of NRC Form | 366A) | | | | | |
| I. <u>DESCRIPTION OF EVENT (Continued)</u> | | | | | | | |
| For a postulated fire in SSA fire area 1-A suction cross-connect valves (1CS-168 a CSIP discharge cross-connect valves (1C actuation in accordance with the requiren CMEB 9.5-1) Section C.5.b. Specifically, 1CS-217 are unprotected inside their MCC in MOVs 1CS-168 and 1CS-169, 1CS-2 above their MCC and inside their MCC in MOVs are vulnerable to fire-induced hot s MOVS 1CS-168 and 1CS-169 valves postulated fire in these fire areas. As in spurious closure of one of the CSII subsequent damage to the running C MOV 1CS-214 provides mini-flow for closure of the mini-flow isolation valv of function would be recoverable sind and 1CS-219 are required to remain postulated fire in this area could resu subsequent loss of flow to charging c of function would be recoverable sind Simultaneous spurious actuation of m 217, 1CS-218, and 1CS-219) could r high head safety injection, and subset Upon discovery, interim compensatory ac fires. These measures included de-energy susceptibility to mal-operation of compon | and 1CS-169), til CS-217, 1CS-21 ments of NUREC , the control pow CC in SSA fire at 14, 1CS-218, at the same fire a shorts. S are required to s a result, a fire P suction valves CSIP credited by the CSIPs. As the and subseque ce the CSIPs wo open to provide all in spurious cloor high head saf ce the CSIPs wo nultiple valves in result in loss of result in loss of result in loss of result and the CSIPs wo | ne CSIP mi 8, and 1CS 6 0800, Att ver cable for rea 1-A-BA ad 1CS-219 irea. There remain op in this area s, loss of sur the SSA for a result, a ent loss of r build not be charging for soure of on ety injection build not be n the charg mini-flow to to the runn lemented to suction cro | ni-flow isolatic S-219) are not achment 1 (Br or charging sys L-B. The cont of are unprotec- are unprotec- are unprotec- fore, the unpro- en to provide (1-A-BAL-B, 1) action flow to the charging flo fire in this are nini-flow to the damaged. Mill low from the re damaged. Mill low from the re e of the CSIP n credited by to damaged. ing system (i.e. the CSIPs an ing CSIP. o minimize the bass-connect values. | on valve (1 protected ranch Tec stem MOV trol power ted for ab otected ca CSIP suc 261' eleva he running w and RC a could re CSIP s. OVs 1CS- unning CS discharge he SSA. | ICS-21 I from s hnical /s ICS cables out on ables f tion du ation) c g CSIP P seal sult in Howev 217, 1 SIP. As valve Howev 1CS-2 low to | 4), and spurious Position -168 and for e foot or these ring a ould rese , and cooling spuriou rer, this CS-218 s a resu s, and rer, this 14, 1CS chargin | sult sult sult loss loss g or |

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| 17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional co | opies of NRC Form | 366A) | | | | | |
| I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT (Continued) | | | | | | | |
| For a postulated fire in SSA fire areas 1-/ safety injection MOVs, three MOVs in ea 1SI-323, respectively); and two MOV's in Tank (BIT) and the safety injection to the actuation in accordance with the requirer CMEB 9.5-1) Section C.5.b. Specifically, are unprotected inside their MCCs in SS/ 1SI-301, 1SI-311, and 1SI-323 are routed with no fire barrier. In addition, the contri- are routed through SSA fire areas 1-A-B/ cables for these MOVs are vulnerable to prevent transfer of inventory from the RW opening of these multiple valves from a fi inventory from the RWST to the containing the water normally used for inventory mat from a suction source (i.e., the RWST) or 1SI-86 are normally closed, so a postulat valves could result in damage to the runn For a postulated fire in SSA fire areas 1-/ two containment spray MOVs (1CT-102 a accordance with the requirements of NUI Section C.5.b. Specifically, the control pa- with no fire barrier. Similarly, the control 1-A-EPA and 1-A-BAL-B with no fire barr vulnerable to fire-induced hot shorts. The inventory from the RWST to the containing from a fire in any of these fire areas could containment recirculation sump. If this tr inventory makeup to the Reactor Cooland the RWST) credited by the SSA. Howevi and maintain cold shutdown would not be For a postulated fire in SSA fire areas 1-/ elevation) or 12-A-CRC1 (305' elevation) the Volume Control Tank (VCT) and for the protected from spurious actuation in accor (Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1) system MOVs 1CS-165 and 1CS-166 are and 12-A-CRC1 with no fire barrier. The induced hot shorts. The charging system the VCT during a postulated fire in these spurious closure of one of the VCT outlet damage to the running CSIP credited by | ach area, (1SI-30 both areas, the e RCS isolation of ments of NURE of the control power A fire area 1-A- d through SSA for ol power cables AL-B and 1-A-B fire-induced ho VST to the conta- fire in either of the nent recirculation akeup to the Rea- redited by the S ted fire in these ning CSIP due to A-EPA, 1A-EPE and 1CT-105) a REG 0800, Atta- ower cables for power cables for power cables for ier. Therefore, for ese valves are in nent recirculation d result in inadv ransfer of invent t System (RCS) ver, back-up sour- e affected. A-CSRA (286' e), certain cabling two containmen ordance with the Section C.5.b. e routed through refore, the unpri- n valves are req fire areas. As a t valves, loss of | 00, 1SI-310 e outlet isola valve (1SI-8 G 0800, Att wer cables f BAL-B. Sin fire area 1-/ s for safety i AL-C with r at shorts. Th ainment rec hese areas on sump. If actor Coola iSA. The sa areas resu o run out co 3, or 1-A-BA are not prote achment 1 (i MOV 1CT- or MOVs 10 the unprote required to on sump. S vertently trait tory were to) would not irces would elevation), 1 g for the two t spray MOV e requireme Specifically h SSA fire a cotected cat quired to rer a result, a fi suction flow | and 1SI-322 ation valve (1% 36), are not prised in the prised in the | 2; or 1SI-30 SI-3) of the rotected fro ranch Tecl -300, 1SI-3 ntrol power into their N em MOVs of Therefore re required np. Simult n inadverte of inventory CS) would system M us opening vation), ce urious actu- nical Position of these M of prevent t ing of eithe ntory from ater norma rom a suct and the at of elevation s (1CS-165 and 1CT-1 G 0800, At power cab RA, 1-A-CS MOVs are provide CS nese areas ng CSIP, a | 01, 1SI- Borom bm sput hnical F 310, and r cables MCCs in 1SI-3 a e, the u d to shut aneous ently tra- y were not be 1OVs 1S g of the ertain cat and SSA OVs and transfer er of the the RV bility to bility to SRB, 12- s could c could | -311, a Injecti rious Positior d 1SI-3 s for M0 n this a and 1SI- unprotect availat SI-3 and ese multi abling fo EB 9.5- a 1-A-E A fire ar r of ese valv VST to d for urce (i.e achiev A-CR (: S-166) e not chargin result in | nd ion 322 OVs rea -86 cted bug ur, ble d tiple or -1) EPB reas the e., re 305' of s, fire- m n |

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| In addition, the control power cables for I CSRA, 1-A-CSRB, 12-A-CR, and 12-A-C MOVs are vulnerable to fire-induced hot of inventory from the RWST to the contai valves from a fire in any of these fire area to the containment recirculation sump. If inventory makeup to the Reactor Coolan the RWST) credited by the SSA. Howev and maintain cold shutdown would not be For a postulated fire in SSA fire areas 1- cabling for the four safety injection MOVs actuation in accordance with the requirer CMEB 9.5-1) Section C.5.b. Specifically and 1SI-107 are routed through SSA fire safety injection MOVs 1SI-3 and 1SI-86 a therefore, are vulnerable to fire-induced the closed, so a postulated fire in either of th could result in damage to the running CS For a postulated fire in SSA fire area 1-A accordance with the requirements of NU Section C.5.b and therefore is vulnerable | CRC1 with no fir shorts. These v inment recircula as could result i f this transfer of it System (RCS) ver, back-up sou e affected. A-CSRA (286' et s (1SI-3, 1SI-4, ments of NURE v, the control pov e area 1-A-CSRA are routed throu hot shorts. The base areas resul SIP due to run o A-CSRB (286' et IREG 0800, Atta | e barrier. The valves are re- tion sump. n inadverter inventory w would not b rces would l levation) or 1SI-86, and 3 0800, Atta ver cables fre- se safety inj ting in spuri- ut conditions evation), cer chment 1 (E | erefore, the u equired to ren Spurious open ty transferrin ere to occur, be available fi be available, 1-A-CSRB (2 1SI-107) are achment 1 (Bi or safety inject barrier, and area 1-A-CS jection system ous opening s. | unprotecte nain shut t ening of eit ng invento the water rom a suct and the at 286' elevat not protec ranch Tec ction MOV the contro RB with n n valves a of these m | d cable o preve her of f ry from normal ion sou bility to cited fro hinical F s 1SI-4 o fire bar re norm ultiple | es for th ent tran these the RV ly used urce (i.e achiev ertain m spur Positior , 1SI-8 r cable arrier a nally valves | nese Isfer VST I for 2., e rious 6, s for nd |
| The C CSIP suction cross-connect v the credited A CSIP is aligned to its closure of this valve could result in d The B CT pump and its associated d respectively, to ensure that the RWS containment spray ring header. The these multiple components could respectively available from a suction source The RCP Thermal Barrier Flow Cont to the RCP seals. As a result, a pos and loss of RCP seal cooling credite The RCS wide range pressure transit of RCS pressure and level. Therefor pressure and level indication credited | suction source. lamage to the ru lischarge valve (ST inventory is n refore, a postula sult in the water e (i.e., the RWS trol Valve (1CC- tulated fire in th ed by the SSA. mitters (PT-402 re, a postulated | Therefore, nning CSIP (1CT-88) and ot discharge ated fire in the normally us T) credited b (252) is requise a area could and PT-403 | a postulated e required to ed to the cont his area resul ed for invento by the SSA. lired to remai d result in spu 3) provide the | fire resultin remain off ainment v ting in spu ory makeu n open to p urious clos Operator | and sh and sh ia the rious a p to the provide ure of f with an | spuriou nut, actuatio e RCS r e CCW this val n indica | n of not flow ve |

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| 17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional co | opies of NRC Form | | | | | | |
| I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT (Continued) | | | | | | | |
| For a postulated fire in SSA fire area 1-A accordance with the requirements of NUI Section C.5.b and therefore is vulnerable off and its associated discharge valve (10 is not discharged to the containment via t this area resulting in spurious actuation o for inventory makeup to the RCS not bein SSA. | REG 0800, Atta to fire-induced CT-50) is requir the containmen of these multiple | chment 1 (E hot shorts. ed to remain t spray ring component | Branch Techni The "A" CT p n shut to ensu header. Ther ts could result | ical Positio oump is re ure that the refore, a p t in the wa | on CME quired t e RWST ostulate ater nor | EB 9.5-1 to rema T invent ed fire it mally us | 1) ain tory n sed |
| For a postulated fire in SSA fire area 1-A barriers flow control valve (1CC-252) and certain cabling for the Boron Injection Tar- isolation valve (1SI-86), and certain cabli- pressurizer spray valve loop "B" (1RC-10) requirements of NUREG 0800, Attachme Therefore this cabling is vulnerable to fire 252 are required to remain open to provid result, a postulated fire in this area could to RCP thermal barrier heat exchangers of system MOVs 1SI-3 and 1SI-86 are norm opening of these multiple valves could re postulated fire in this areas resulting in the it had been secured) and the spurious op result in an inadvertent pressurizer spray For a postulated fire in SSA fire area 1-A Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) [BA] motor pu (1CS-166) is not protected from spurious Attachment 1 (Branch Technical Position fire-induced hot shorts. The AFW valve of service. As a result, a fire in this area co AFW flow to the "A" and "C" steam gener remain open to provide CSIP suction fror fire in this area could result in spurious cl CSIP, and subsequent damage to the run cooling. | d the CCW supp ink outlet isolation ing for the "B" re- 03) is not protect e-induced hot shaded cCW flow to result in spurior credited by the mally closed, so esult in damage the simultaneous pening of pressury and subseques A-BAL-A (190', 2 ump "A" dischart s actuation in actor to CMEB 9.5-1) St take-19 is require pould result in spur rators credited b m the VCT during losure of the VCC | bly valve to F on valve (1S eactor coola ted from spe- echnical Pos- horts. The C the RCP th us closure c SSA for RC a postulated to the running spurious st urizer spray nt depressure 216', 236', and ge valve (1/2) cordance w Section C.5.1 red to remai urious closure by the SSA. ng a postula CT outlet val | RCP seals an SI-3) and the s int pump (1RC urious actuation sition CMEB 9 CCW system 1 hermal barrier of either of the CP seal cooling d fire in these ing CSIP due f tart of the "B" valve loop "B" rization. nd 286' elevat AF-19) and the ith the require b. Therefore in open while re of this valve The charging ited fire in these live, loss of suc- | d motor of safety inject C-RCPB) a on in acco 0.5-1) Sect MOVs 1C0 heat exch se valves g. The saf areas res to run out reactor co " valve 1R tions), cer- this cablin its associa e and ther g system v se fire are ction flow | colers (ction to and the ordance tion C.5 C-208 a angers and los fety inje- sulting ir condition polant p C-103 tain cat tlet isola NUREC ng is vul ated pur refore th valve is as. As to the r | 1CC-20 the RC with the 5.b. and 1CC . As a ss of flo ection n spuric ons. A ump (a could oling for ation va 3 0800, Inerable mp is ir require a resul unning | C- bw cus fter r the alve e to n of ed to lt, a |

| Enclosure to HNP-05-113 | | | | | | | |
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| NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS (1-2001) | SION | | | | | | |
| LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) | | | | | | | |
| 1. FACILITY NAME | 2. DOCKET | | 5. LER NUMBER | | | 3. PAG | E |
| | | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | - | | |
| Harris Nuclear Plant – Unit 1 | 05000400 | 2002 | - 004 - | - 09 | 11 | OF | 23 |
| 17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional c | opies of NRC Form | 366A) | | | | | |
| I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT (Continued) | | | | | | | |
| For a postulated fire in SSA fire area 1-A control valve (1CS-231); for the pressuri associated isolation (block) valve (1RC-associated discharge valve (1CT-50); ar protected from spurious actuation in acc (Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1) hot shorts. The charging system valve to boration flowpath. As a result, a fire in the loss of RCP seal cooling and a boral is closed and its associated isolation val in this area could result in spurious oper not be closed resulting in the transfer of CT pump 1CT-E004 is required to remain shut to ensure that the RWST im spray ring header. Therefore, a postulated components could result in the water no from a suction source (i.e., the RWST) of the "B" switchgear room for a postulated loss of cooling could affect the performa achieve and maintain safe shutdown. For a postulated fire in SSA fire area 1-A water (NSW) [KG] supply valve (1SW-30; emergency diesel generator (EDG) (1DC with the requirements of NUREG 0800, C.5.b. Therefore, this cabling is vulnerar required to close to provide isolation bet spurious actuation of these multiple com valve (1SW-40) to the "B" ESW header s system flow would be split between the the performance of equipment credited i shutdown. | zer power-opera 113); for the "A" hd for the switch ordance with the) Section C.5.b. ICS-231 is requi- his area could re- tion flowpath cre- ve 1RC-113 is on ing of the press some RCS inve- in off and its ass ventory is not dis ted fire in this are rmally used for i credited by the S I fire in this SSA nce of equipmer A-ACP (286' elever b) to the "A" eme G-E003) [EK] is in Attachment 1 (B ble to fire-induced ween NSW and ponents could re- subsequently op "A" and "B" trains in the SSA and s -A-BAL (286' an- utlet valve), 1NI- njection filter bac vith the requirem of C.5.b. Therefore utdown condition et valve closed, to could result in an | ated relief v containme gear room Therefore red to rema- sult in spur- dited by the pen during urizer POR ntory to the ociated dis scharged to ea resulting nventory m SA. The a fire area. The ranch Tech ed hot shor ESW. A p esult in a fa en. With b s. Thus, the subsequent d 305' elev 107 (seal w ckwash prin- tents of NU re, this cab is and is de hen a post n inadverte | alve (PORV) (nt spray pump "B" air handle ents of NUREC this cabling is ain open for R rious closure of e SSA. The p normal plant V and its asso e Pressurizer F charge valve (b the containing g in spurious a takeup to the I ir handler AH- Therefore, a fi in the SSA an tain control ca vice water (ES ed from spurion ts. The NSW ostulated fire i ailure of the "B oth NSW supplis diminished ly the ability to ation), certain vater injection mary water su REG 0800, Ad ling is vulneration pressurized b ulated fire in the oth dilution or r | (1RC-114) (1CT-E00 r (AH-13-1 G 0800, Al vulnerable CP seal cro of this valv ressurizer operation. ociated iso Relief Tank (1CT-50) is actuation o RCS not b 13-1B pro re in this a d subseque bling for th SW) [BI] he us actuation CMEB 9.3 system valves cooling ca billing for the SW) [BI] he us actuation control ca filter back ply valves cooling ca control ca filter back | and its D4) and B) is not tachme e to fire- ooling a re and the PORV As a re- olation vi- k (PRT) s require e contai f these eing ava- vides co- area result f these eing ava- vides co- area result f the NS on in ac- 5-1) Sec- alve 1SV a resulting the the NS open, the opacity co- and mai abling fo wash ni) is not p 1 (Bran- induced psig wite esulting | its int 1 -induce ind as herefor 1RC-1 esult, a alve co . The ed to nment multipl ailable ooling i ulting i is abilit al serv nd the coordar ction V-39 is SW su he ESV could a intain s r the 1 itrogen protect d hot in spur | ed a e 14 fire buld "A" e to n y to "B" nce "B" nce s pply W fffect safe FB- ted |

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| Enclosure to HNP-05-113 | <u> </u> | | |
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| NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS | SION | | |
| LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) | | | |
| | 0.000//57 | | |
| 1. FACILITY NAME | 2. DOCKET | 6. LER NUMBER | 3. PAGE |
| | | YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION | |
| Harris Nuclear Plant – Unit 1 | 05000400 | 2002 - 004 - 09 | 12 OF 23 |
| 17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional co | pies of NRC Form | 366A) | |
| I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT (Continued) | | | |
| For a postulated fire in SSA fire area 1-A- manual action in lieu of separation or enc valve from the RWST). Access may not 1 postulated smoke under certain condition not be free from fire damage for a postula Attachment 1 (Branch Technical Position support for normal charging operation for For a postulated fire in SSA fire area 1-A- (1DG-E002) is not protected from spuriou. Attachment 1 (Branch Technical Position fire-induced hot shorts. In addition, the S ventilation system to provide cooling to ce 1-A-BAL-B. However, further review has supported by this configuration. Therefor this cooling configuration could affect the Comprehensive matrices of components components that have been corrected or Matrix 2 lists the components that will be Energy Industry Identification System (EI | losure of certai be feasible to m is. Therefore, c ated fire in acco CMEB 9.5-1) S RCS inventory BAL-B (261' el is actuation in a CMEB 9.5-1) S SA credits the ertain "B" train p identified that s re, a postulated performance o by fire area are will be corrected corrected on or | n control cabling for MOV 1CS-291 hanually operate 1CS-291 due to the one of the redundant trains credited ordance with the requirements of NU Section C.5.b. The opening of this ver- control. evation), certain control cabling for accordance with the requirements of Section C.5.b. Therefore, this cablin use of the "A" train chiller and its as bumps credited for a postulated fire sustained operation of these pumps fire in this area resulting in loss of f equipment credited in the SSA. e presented in the tables below. Ma ed on or before Refueling Outage 13 before RFO-16. | (CSIP suction by the SSA may JREG 0800, valve provides the "A" EDG of NUREG 0800, ng is vulnerable to sociated in SSA fire area a may not be the "A" EDG in |

| 1 | . FACILITY NAME | 2. DOCKET | | 5. LER NUMBER | | 3. PAC | 3E |
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| rris Nuclear I | Plant – Unit 1 | 05000400 | 2002 | - 004 - | 09 | 13 OF | 2 |
| NARRATIVE (If n | nore space is required, use additiona | al copies of NRC Form | | | | | i |
| DESCRI | PTION OF EVENT (Continue | <u>:d)</u> | | | | | |
| | | <u> </u> | | | | 7 | |
| | Com | <u>Matrix 1</u> 1000 Matrix 1 1000 Matrix 1 | Area (RFO | <u>-13)</u> | | | |
| | <u>1-A-BAL-B (261')</u> | <u>1-A-CSRA (2</u> | <u>:86')</u> | <u>12-A-CI</u> | R (305') | | |
| | 1CC-252 | 1CC-252 | 2 1CS-165 | | -165 | | |
| | 1CS-165 | 1CS-165 | 1CS-166 | | -166 | | |
| | 1CS-166 | 1CS-166 | i | <u>12-A-CRC1 (305')</u> | | | |
| | 1CS-168 | 1CS-169 | I | 1CS-165 | | | |
| | 1CS-169 | 1CS-243 | i | 1CS-166 | | | |
| | 1CS-170 | <u>1-A-CSRB (2</u> | <u>:86')</u> | <u>1-A-SWGRA (286')</u> | | | |
| | 1CS-243 | 1CC-208 | 8 | 1CC-249 ^b | | | |
| | 1CS-250 | 1CC-251 | 3 | 1CS- | 243 ^b | | |
| | 1CS-254 | 1CC-252 | | <u>1-A-SWG</u> | <u>RB (286')</u> | Ì | |
| | 1CS-257 | 1CH-279 | 1 | 1CC- | 208ª | | |
| | 1CS-261 | 1CH-660 | 1 | 1CC- | 251 ^ª | | |
| | <u>1-A-BAL-B (286')</u> | 1CS-165 | | 1CS- | -166 | | |
| | 1CS-165 | 1CS-166 | | 1CS | | | |
| | 1RC-115 | 1CS-168 | | 1CS- | | | |
| | <u>1-A-BAL-C (286')</u> | 1CS-217 | | 1CS- | | | |
| | 1CC-208ª | 1CS-220 | | 1CS- | | | |
| | 1CC-251* | 1CS-240 | | 1CS- | | | |
| | 1CS-166 | 1CS-243 | | 1-A-BAL-A | | | |
| | 1CS-243* | 1CS-341 | | <u>236', 8</u> | | | |
| | 1CS-341ª | 1CS-382 | | 1CS | -166 | | |
| | 1CS-382ª | 1CS-423 | | | | | |
| | 1CS-423ª | <u>1-A-EPA (2</u> | | | | | |
| | | 1CC-207 | | | | | |
| | | 1CS-165 | | | | | |
| | | 1CS-166 | | | | | |

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| 1. | FACILITY NAME | 2. DOCKET | | 6. LER NUMBER | | 3. PAGE | | Е |
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| | ore space is required, use additiona | | | | | | | |
| DESCRIF | TION OF EVENT (Continue | <u>d)</u> | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| l | | Matrix 2 | | | | | | |
| | Com | ponents by Fire | Area (RFC | <u>D-16)</u> | | | | |
| | <u>1-A-BAL-B (261')</u> | 1-A-BAL-B (| 261') | 1-A-BAL· | -B (286') | | | |
| | 1CC-207 | (Continued) (Continued) | | | | | | |
| | 1CC-249 | 1RC-RCF | 1RC-RCPA 1SI-301 | | | | | |
| | 1CH-115 | 1RC-RCF | Ъ | 1SI- | 310 | | | |
| | 1CH-116 | 1SI-107 | SI-107 1SI-311 | | | | | |
| | 1CH-125 | 1SI-4 | | | | | | |
| | 1CH-126 | 1SI-52 | 1SI-323 | | | | | |
| | 1CS-182 | <u>1-A-BAL-B (</u> | <u>286')</u> 1SI-86 | | | | | |
| i | 1CS-214 | 1CC-207 | 1CC-207 | | <u>·C (286')</u> | | | |
| | 1CS-217 | 1CC-249 | Ð | 1MS | 5-58 | | | |
| | 1CS-218 | 1CS-243 | 3 | 1MS | 5-59 | | | |
| | 1CS-219 | 1CT-50 | | 1MS | 60 | | | |
| | 1CT-102 | 1CT-E00 | 4 | 1MS | 5-61 | | | |
| | 1CT-105 | 1MS-58 | | 1MS | 62 | | | |
| | 1CT-50 | 1MS-59 | 1 | 1MS | 5-63 | 1 | | |
| | 1CT-E004 | 1MS-60 | I | <u>1-A-CSR</u> | <u>A (286')</u> | | | |
| | 1MS-58 | 1MS-61 | | AH-1 | 3-1B | | | |
| | 1MS-59 | 1MS-62 | | 1CC- | -207 | | | |
| : | 1MS-60 | 1MS-63 | | 1CC- | -249 | 1 | | |
| | 1MS-61 | 1RC-103 | 3 | 1CS | -170 | | | |
| | 1MS-62 | 1RC-107 | 7 | 1CS | -231 | | | |
| | 1MS-63 | 1RC-RCF | PA | 1CT· | -102 | | | |
| | 1RC-103 | 1RC-RCF | В | 1CT- | -105 | | • | |
| | 1RC-107 | 1SI-3 | | 1CT | -50 | - | | |
| | 1RC-116 | 1SI-300 | I | 1CT- | E004 | | | |

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| ris Nuclear | Plant – Unit 1 | 05000400 | 2002 | - 004 - | 09 | 15 OF | : | | |
| ARRATIVE (If | more space is required, use additiona | al copies of NRC Form : | | | | | | | |
| DESCRI | PTION OF EVENT (Continue | <u>d)</u> | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | 7 | | | |
| | Componer | <u>Matrix 2</u> hts by Fire Area (F | | Continued) | | | | | |
| | 1-A-CSRA (286') | 1-A-CSRB (2 | | 1-A-EPI | | | | | |
| | (Continued) | (Continued | <u>1)</u> | <u>(Conti</u> | nued) | | | | |
| | 1RC-103 | 1CT-102 | | 1MS-58 | | | | | |
| | 1RC-107 | 1CT-105 | | 1MS-59 | | | | | |
| | 1RC-113 | 1CT-88 | | 1MS-60 | | | | | |
| | 1RC-114 | 1SI-107 | 1SI-107 | | 1MS-61 | | | | |
| | 1RC-900 | 1SI-3 | | 1MS-62 | | | | | |
| | 1RC-901 | 1SI-4 | | 1MS-63 | | | | | |
| | 1RC-902 | 1SI-86 | | <u>12-A-CI</u> | <u>R (305')</u> | | | | |
| | 1RC-903 | PT-402 | | AH-6 | B-SB | | | | |
| | 1RC-904 | PT-403 | | AH-7 | B-SB | | | | |
| | 1MS-58 | <u>1-A-EPA (20</u> | <u>51')</u> | 1CH | -115 | | | | |
| | 1MS-59 | 1CT-102 | | 1CH | -116 | | | | |
| | 1MS-60 | 1CT-105 | | 1CH | -125 | | | | |
| | 1MS-61 | 1MS-58 | | 1CH | -126 | | | | |
| | 1MS-62 | 1MS-59 | | 1CT | -102 | | | | |
| | 1MS-63 | 1MS-60 | | 1CT | -105 | | | | |
| | 1RC-RCPA | 1MS-61 | | 1SW- | 1171 | | | | |
| | 1RC-RCPB | 1MS-62 | | 1SW- | 1204 | | | | |
| | 1SI-107 | 1MS-63 | | 12-A-CR | <u>C1 (305')</u> | | | | |
| | 1SI-3 | 1SI-107 | | 1CH | -115 | | | | |
| | 1SI-4 | 1SI-4 | | 1CH-116 | | | | | |
| | 1SI-86 | 1SI-52 | 1SI-52 1CH-125 | | 1SI-52 | | -125 | | |
| | <u>1-A-CSRB (286')</u> | <u>1-A-EPB (261')</u> 1CH-126 | | -126 | | | | | |
| | 1AF-49 | 1CT-102 | | 1CT | -102 | | | | |
| | 1AF-51 | 1CT-105 | | 1CT | -105 | | | | |

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| larris Nuclear I | Plant – Unit 1 | 05000400 | 2002 | - 004 - | 09 | 16 | OF | 23 |
| | nore space is required, use additiona | | | | | | - | |
| • | PTION OF EVENT (Continue | - | · | | | | | |
| | | | | | | — 1 | | |
| | | <u>Matrix 2</u> | | | | | | |
| | Componen | ts by Fire Area (I | | Continued) | | | | |
| | 12-A-CRC1 (305') | <u>1-C (261)</u> |) | | | | | |
| | <u>(Continued)</u> | 1RC-900 | I. | | | | | |
| | 1SC-E011 | 1RC-901 | | | | | | |
| | 1SC-E014 | 1RC-902 | | | | | | |
| | 1SW-1171 | 1RC-903 | | | | | | |
| | 1SW-1204 | 1RC-904 | | | | | | |
| | 1SW-1208 | 1RC-905 | | | | | | |
| | <u>1-A-SWGRA (286')</u> | <u>1-A-ACP (2</u> | | | | | | |
| | 1RC-107 | 1SW-39 | | | | | | |
| | 1RC-RCPA | 1DG-E00 | | | | | | |
| | <u>1-A-SWGRB (286')</u> | <u>12-A-BAL (286'</u> | <u>& 305')</u> | | | | | |
| | 1CS-171 | 1FB-8 | | | | | | |
| | 1CS-217 | 1NI-107 | | | | | | |
| | 1CS-220 | 1PM-87 | | | | | | |
| | 1CS-240 | | | | | | | |
| | 1RC-103 | | | | | | | |
| | 1RC-RCPB | | | | | | | |
| | 1SI-3 1SI-86 | | | | | | | |
| | 1-A-BAL-A (190', 216', | | | | | | | |
| | <u>236', & 261')</u> | | | | | | | |
| | 1AF-19 | | | | | | | |
| | <u>1-A-BAL-A (236')</u> | | | | | | | |
| | 1CS-291 | | | | | | | |
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| Enclo | sure to HNP-05-113 | | | | | | | | |
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| | ORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS | SION | | | | | | | |
| (1-2001) L | CENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 0.040 | | |
| | 1. FACILITY NAME | 2. DOCKET | · | 5. LER NUMBER | | <u> </u> - | 3. PAGE | <u> </u> | |
| | | | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | ļ | | | |
| Harri | is Nuclear Plant – Unit 1 | 05000400 | 2002 | - 004 - | 09 | 17 | OF | 23 | |
| | RRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional co | | | | | | | | |
| u. | CAUSE OF EVENT | • | • | | | | | | |
| | The cause of these conditions is inadequate original Safe Shutdown Analysis. Specifically, certain conductor-to-conductor interactions (i.e., hot shorts) or certain operator manual actions were not adequately evaluated in the initial Safe Shutdown Analysis. | | | | | | | | |
| m. | SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE | | | | | | | | |
| | All of the findings are based on scenarios that have not actually occurred. Therefore, there are no actual adverse safety consequences. | | | | | | | | |
| | Potential safety consequences for postul also result in spurious closure of certain a | | | BAL-B and 1- | A-EPA (20 | 61' elev | ation) t | hat | |
| | Loss of suction flow and subsequent and RCP seal cooling, Loss of flow to RCP thermal barrier h Loss of charging or high head safety | neat exchangers rinjection flow c | s credited b | by the SSA for the SSA, | RCP sea | l cooling | g, | | |
| | Simultaneous spurious actuation of r flow to the CSIPs and loss of flow to the running CSIP, | | | | | | | | |
| | Simultaneous spurious actuation of r water system could result in degrada without credited CSIPs. | | | | | | | g | |
| | Potential safety consequences for postul also result in spurious opening of certain | ated fires in fire SSA MOVs ma | areas 1-A- | BAL-B and 1- | A-EPA (20 | 61' elev | ration) t | hat | |
| | Spurious opening of valves in the co to the containment recirculation sum needed, from the containment recirci Simultaneous spurious opening of m to the CSIP in service due to run out | p. However, the ulation sump. ultiple valves in | is water inv | entory would s | still be ava | ailable f | or use, | if . | |
| | Potential safety consequences for a post spurious opening of certain SSA MOVs r | | e area 1-A- | BAL-B (286' e | levation) I | that also | o result | s in | |
| [| Simultaneous spurious opening of m | ultiple valves in | the safetv | injection syste | m could r | esult in | transfe | er of | |

- RWST inventory to the containment recirculation sump. However, this water inventory would still be available for use, if needed, from the containment recirculation sump.
 Simultaneous spurious opening of multiple valves in the safety injection system could result in damage to
- Simultaneous spurious opening of multiple valves in the safety injection system could result in damage to the CSIP in service due to run out conditions.

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| NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001) | | | | | | | | | | |
| LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. FACILITY NAME | 2. DOCKET | 6 | LER NUMBER | | | 3. PAGE | | | | |
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| Harris Nuclear Plant – Unit 1 | 05000400 | 2002 | - 004 - | 09 | 18 | OF | 23 | | | |
| 17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional of | copies of NRC Form | 366A) | | | | | | | | |
| III. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE (Continued) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Potential safety consequences for a postulated fire in fire area 1-A-EPB (261' elevation) that also results in spurious opening of certain SSA MOVs may include: Spurious opening of valves in the containment spray system could result in transfer of RWST inventory to the containment recirculation sump. However, this water inventory would still be available for use, if | | | | | | | | | | |
| Potential safety consequences for a pos | needed, from the containment recirculation sump. Potential safety consequences for a postulated fire in fire area 1-A-BAL-C (286' elevation) that also results in spurious actuation of certain SSA MOVs may include: | | | | | | | | | |
| Loss of flow to RCP thermal barrier However, RCP seals would still be p charging/safety injection trains. Simultaneous spurious opening of n RWST inventory to the containment available for use, if needed, from the | Loss of flow to RCP thermal barrier heat exchangers credited by the SSA for RCP seal cooling. However, RCP seals would still be protected by the normal seal injection function of the redundant charging/safety injection trains. Simultaneous spurious opening of multiple valves in the safety injection system could result in transfer of RWST inventory to the containment recirculation sump. However, this water inventory would still be available for use, if needed, from the containment recirculation sump. Simultaneous spurious opening of multiple valves in the safety injection system could result in damage to | | | | | | | | | |
| Potential safety consequences for a poselevation), 12-A-CR (305' elevation) and certain SSA MOVs may include: | stulated fire in fire d 12-A-CRC1 (30 | e areas 1-A 15' elevatior | -CSRA (286' e n) that also res | elevation), sults in sp | 1-A-CS urious a | SRB (28 Inctuatio | 86' on of | | | |
| Loss of suction flow and subsequent and RCP seal cooling. Spurious opening of valves in the containment recirculation sum needed, from the containment recirculation | ontainment spray np. However, thi | v system co | uld result in tra | ansfer of I | RWST i | nvento | ry | | | |
| Potential safety consequences for a pos (286' elevation) that also results in spuri | | | | | and 1-A | A-CSRE | 3 | | | |
| Simultaneous spurious opening of n the CSIP in service due to run out c | | the safety i | njection syste | m could r | esult in | damag | je to | | | |
| | Potential safety consequences for a postulated fire in fire area 1-A-CSRB (286' elevation) that also results in spurious actuation of certain components include: | | | | | | | | | |
| Discharge of RWST inventory to the water normally used for inventory m RWST) credited by the SSA. | Discharge of RWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray ring header, resulting in the water normally used for inventory makeup to the RCS not available from a suction source (i.e., the | | | | | | | | | |
| Loss of flow to RCP thermal barrier Loss of RCS pressure and level ind and level monitoring. | | | | | | | re | | | |
| NRC FORM 366A (1-2001) | <u></u> | | | <u> </u> | . <u> </u> | | | | | |

| Enclosure to HNP-05-113 | | | | | | | | |
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| NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS | SION | | | | | | | |
| LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) | | | | | | | | |
| 1. FACILITY NAME | 2. DOCKET | 6. LER NUMBER | 3. PAGE | | | | | |
| | | YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER | | | | | | |
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| 17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional co | pies of NRC Form | 366A) | | | | | | |
| III. <u>SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE (Continued)</u> | | | | | | | | |
| Potential safety consequences for a post results in spurious actuation of certain co | mponents inclu | de: | | | | | | |
| Discharge of RWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray ring header, resulting in the water normally used for inventory makeup to the RCS not being available from a suction source (i.e., the RWST) credited by the SSA. | | | | | | | | |
| Potential safety consequences for a postulated fire in fire area 1-A-SWGRB (286' elevation) that also results in spurious actuation of certain components include: | | | | | | | | |
| Loss of flow to RCP thermal barrier heat exchangers credited by the SSA for RCP seal cooling. Simultaneous spurious opening of multiple valves in the safety injection system could result in damage to the CSIP in service due to run out conditions. | | | | | | | | |
| | Simultaneous spurious start of the "B" reactor coolant pump (after it had been secured) and the spurious opening of a pressurizer spray valve could result in an inadvertent pressurizer spray and subsequent | | | | | | | |
| Potential safety consequences for a post elevations) that also results in spurious a | | | and 286' | | | | | |
| Loss of AFW flow to the "A" and "C" s Loss of suction flow and subsequent and RCP seal cooling. | | | for charging flow | | | | | |
| Potential safety consequences for a post spurious actuation of certain components | | e area 1-A-CSRA (286' elevation) t | hat also results in | | | | | |
| Loss of flow to RCP thermal barrier h flowpath credited by the SSA. | leat exchangers | s for RCP seal cooling and loss of a | a boration | | | | | |
| Spurious actuation of multiple valves Relief Tank (PRT). | | - | | | | | | |
| containment via the containment spra makeup to the RCS not being availab | Spurious actuation of multiple components could result in discharge of RWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray ring header, resulting in the water normally used for inventory makeup to the RCS not being available from a suction source (i.e., the RWST) credited by the SSA. Loss of cooling potentially affecting equipment credited in the SSA. | | | | | | | |
| Potential safety consequences for a post elevation) and 1-C (261'elevation in conta components in the previously identified S components identified on October 20, Oc | ainment) and th SSA fire areas th | e discoveries of components or co nat also results in spurious actuatio | mbinations of n of certain | | | | | |
| Simultaneous spurious start of the "A opening of a pressurizer spray valve depressurization. Loss of flow to RCP thermal barrier h | could result in a | an inadvertent pressurizer spray ar | nd subsequent | | | | | |
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| Enclosure to HNP-05-113 | | | | | | | | | |
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| NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS | SION | | | | | | | | |
| LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. FACILITY NAME | 2. DOCKET | 6. LER | NUMBER | 3. PAG | E | | | | |
| | | YEAR SEC | UENTIAL REVISION UMBER NUMBER | | | | | | |
| Harris Nuclear Plant – Unit 1 | t 1 05000400 2002 - 004 - 09 20 of 23 | | | | | | | | |
| 17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional co | pies of NRC Form | 366A) | | | | | | | |
| III. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE (Continued) | | | | | | | | | |
| Transfer of some RCS inventory to containment atmosphere. However, the RCS high point vent system is designed to ensure that any transfer of coolant inventory is less than the make-up capacity of one charging pump in the event of a Safety Class 2 pipe break or inadvertent valve actuations. In addition, the path from the reactor vessel head utilizes a 3/8-inch diameter orifice, which also limits flow to less than the make-up capacity of one charging pump in the event of a Safety Class 2 pipe break or inadvertent valve actuations. | | | | | | | | | |
| Potential safety consequences for a postulated fire in the two additional SSA fire areas 1-A-ACP (286' elevation) and 12-A-BAL (286' and 305' elevations) and the discoveries of components or combinations of components in the previously identified SSA fire areas that also results in spurious actuation of certain components identified on January 18, 2005 of this LER include: | | | | | | | | | |
| Diminished cooling capacity potentially affecting the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown as credited by the SSA. | | | | | | | | | |
| An inadvertent dilution or nitrogen inju circulation capability. | | | - | - | | | | | |
| An unexpected RCS reduction in RCS safe shutdown as credited by the SSA | | entially affecting t | the ability to achiev | e and mainta | IN | | | | |
| Loss of mini-flow to the "A" CSIP, whi A spurious opening of "A" AFW flow of generator (SG). | | | | | ı | | | | |
| Loss of chilled water to the "A" switch loss of make-up capability or cooling in the SSA. | | | | | | | | | |
| An unexpected diversion of chilled wa the chiller surge tank and lifting of its | associated reli | ef valve. | | | g of | | | | |
| Loss of auxiliary reservoir ESW trave Simultaneous spurious opening of on operation of its related SG PORV blo | ne or more SG | power-operated r | elief valves (POR) | /s) and mal- | | | | | |
| Potential safety consequences for a post (236' elevation) and 1-A-BAL-B (261' elev manual operator action which may not be by a postulated fire in the area include: | vation), that als | o results in a pot | ential loss of comp | onents due to | a | | | | |
| One of the redundant trains credited for RCS inventory control. Loss of the "A" EDG, which in a certa credited in the SSA. | | | | | | | | | |
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| Enclosure | to H | INP-0 | 5-113 |
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| | 1. FACILITY NAME | 2. DOCKET | | . LER N | UMBER | | | 3. PAG | E |
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| | | | YEAR | SEQI | JENTIAL | REVISION NUMBER | | | |
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| 17. NA | RRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional co | opies of NRC Form | 366A) | | | | | | |
| 111. | SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE (Continued) | | | | | | | | |
| • | The defense-in-depth provided by the fire consequences by: | e protection pro | gram mitiga | ates sc | ome of th | nese pote | ntial sa | fety | |
| | Prevention of fire initiation, Prompt detection of fires or incipient fire conditions by installed automatic detection systems, Effective suppression of fires by installed automatic fire suppression systems with fire brigade backup. | | | | | | | | |
| | Opening and de-energizing the CSIP suction cross-connect valves (1CS-168 and 1CS-169) also mitigates the potential safety consequences of a postulated fire in fire area 1-A-BAL-B. | | | | | | | | |
| | These findings of unanalyzed conditions are being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). No systems, structures, or components were inoperable at the time of discovery that significantly contributed to the event. | | | | | | | | |
| IV. | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS | | | | | | | | |
| | Upon discovery, interim compensatory ad fires. These measures included de-energ 169) to minimize susceptibility to mal-ope of concern. | gizing the CSIP | suction cro | oss-co | nnect va | alves (1CS | S-168 a | nd 1CS | 5- |
| | The additional fire areas have been adde condition identified on February 13, 2004 October 29, 2004 of this LER, a roving fir compensatory actions for other safe shut is closed during normal operations. Addi performed to ensure that no in situ ignitio area. For the other areas and the conditi | For the condi- re watch was all tdown related is itional walkdown on sources and it | tions identi ready poste sues, exce ns of fire ar no interven | fied on ed in th pt for f ea 1-C ing or | n Octobe ne fire ar îre area in the a transien | er 20, Octo reas of co 1-C since area of int at combus | ober 26 ncern a the co erest w tibles w | , and is interi ntainm ere rere in f | im ient the |
| | Complete a validation of the HNP safe sh | nutdown analysi | s. | | | | | | |
| | Restore the identified conditions of this L the NRC. The previously reported condit #56427). | | | | | | | | |
| | These actions are scheduled to be comp 2006) for the components listed on Matrix these actions are scheduled to be comple | x 1 of this LER. | For the co | nditior | ns listed | on Matrix | 2 of th | is LER | |

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| Enclosure to HNP-05-113 | | | | | | | | | |
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| NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001) | | | | | | | | | |
| LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. FACILITY NAME | 2. DOCKET | 6. LER NUMBER | 3. PAGE | | | | | | |
| | | YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION | | | | | | | |
| Harris Nuclear Plant – Unit 1 | - Unit 1 05000400 2002 - 004 - 09 | | | | | | | | |
| 17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional co | pies of NRC Form | 366A) | | | | | | | |
| V. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS | | | | | | | | | |
| NRC Inspection Report 50-400/00-09 (da | NRC Inspection Report 50-400/00-09 (dated February 3, 2000) | | | | | | | | |
| meet plant licensing basis requirements a FSAR to revise the fire rating of selected fire area separation barrier between the "I the "A" Train Cable Spreading Room. Ba and 1995, this fire barrier did not have the in the "B" Train Switchgear Room, of sign barrier assembly and damage certain red shutdown systems. The final significance (White finding). The root cause was inad actions included modifications to the affect barrier modifications do not invalidate test relation to the subject event, therefore, the | This inspection identified two unresolved items (URIs) concerning adequacy of a Thermo-Lag fire barrier to meet plant licensing basis requirements and the adequacy of the 10 CFR 50.59 for changes made to the FSAR to revise the fire rating of selected Thermo-Lag fire barriers. The identified fire barrier serves as the fire area separation barrier between the "B" Train Switchgear Room/Auxiliary Control Panel (ACP) Room and the "A" Train Cable Spreading Room. Based on Thermo-Lag barrier fire resistance tests conducted in 1994 and 1995, this fire barrier did not have the required three-hour fire resistance rating. Therefore, a single fire in the "B" Train Switchgear Room, of significant intensity and duration, could breach the Thermo-Lag fire barrier assembly and damage certain redundant "A" train cables and their associated functions of safe shutdown systems. The final significance determination for these two items was one notice of violation (White finding). The root cause was inadequate fire testing of the installed fire barrier. The corrective actions included modifications to the affected rooms and establishing review criteria to ensure that future fire barrier modifications do not invalidate test results. The root cause for this previous event is not significant in relation to the subject event, therefore, the previous corrective actions would not be expected to identify or prevent the deficiencies identified by this LER. | | | | | | | | |
| penetrations through the Thermo-Lag Wa revealed an additional thermo-lag fire bar These conditions do not comply with the The root cause was identified to be incom construction walkdown. The penetration 97-01123) stated, "Nothing indicates a co missed both in design and in the final cor significant in relation to the subject event | HNP LER 97-006-00 (reported 4/17/97) This LER reported that an undocumented breach was identified in the thermo-lag wall while sealing penetrations through the Thermo-Lag Wall in the 286' Cable Spreading Room "A." Follow-up investigation revealed an additional thermo-lag fire barrier deficiency in a floor drain assembly in the cable spread room. These conditions do not comply with the 3-hour fire-rated barrier requirements specified in the HNP FSAR. The root cause was identified to be incomplete design, incomplete construction, and incomplete final construction walkdown. The penetration was modified per ESR 95-00715. The root cause investigation (CR 97-01123) stated, "Nothing indicates a common trend to the fact of an area of a Thermo-lag panel being missed both in design and in the final construction walkdown." The root cause for this previous event is not significant in relation to the subject event, therefore, the previous corrective actions would not be expected to identify or prevent the deficiencies identified by this LER. | | | | | | | | |
| HNP LER 97-020-00 (reported 9/12/97) | | | | | | | | | |
| This LER reported that design discrepand Shutdown Analysis in Case of Fire. Thes elevation of the RAB for the EDG Fuel Oil separation requirements to maintain safe engineering oversight and inadequate des modification was installed to provide the r investigation (CR 97-03861) stated, "A re- line 43 was performed and no additional of of an additional fire area (1-A-EPB) was p cause for this previous event is significant not identify or prevent the deficiencies ide (1CT-102) was not included in the SSA. additional fire area only of associated cab | e discrepancie I Transfer Pum shutdown capa sign verification required protect view of the safe cable protection berformed t in relation to t entified by this L The root cause | s pertain to safety-related electrical ps "A" and "B". These cables did n ability. These deficiencies were can n during initial plant construction. A tion for the cited cables. The root of e shutdown cables in the unit 2 are n discrepancies were found. Also, a and no similar deficiencies were ide he subject event. The previous con LER because the valve identified in for the previous event performed a | I cables in 261' not comply with used by plant cause as north of column an in-depth review entified." The root rrective action did this fire area | | | | | | |

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| NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS | SION | | | | | | | |
| LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) | | | | | | | | |
| 1. FACILITY NAME | 2. DOCKET | 6. LER NUMBER | | | | 3. PAGE | | |
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| Harris Nuclear Plant – Unit 1 | 05000400 | 2002 | - 00 |)4 - | 09 | 23 | OF | 23 |
| 17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) VI. COMMITMENTS | | | | | | | | |
| The actions committed to by Carolina Power & Light Company doing business as Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. (PEC) in this document are identified below. Any other actions discussed in this submittal represent intended or planned actions by PEC. They are described for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments. | | | | | | | | |
| Commitment(s) | | | | Scheduled Completion Date | | | | |
| 1. Complete a validation of the HNP safe shutdown analysis. | | | | June 30, 2006 | | | | |
| Restore the conditions identified in Matrix 1 of this LER to compliance by design changes or other methods approved by the NRC. | | | | Refueling Outage 13 (Current schedule May 15, 2006) | | | | |
| Restore the conditions identified in Matrix 2 of this LER to compliance by design changes or other methods approved by the NRC. | | | | Refueling Outage 16 (Current schedule November 5, 2010) | | | | |
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