In November, CP&L produced analysis which asserts that the probability of one particular type of nuclear waste accident at Shearon Harris is about 1 in 5 million in any given year.  A prominent expert assisting Orange County used similar data to estimate the probability at about 1 in 2,000 over a thirty year operating period.  Both estimates exclude numerous other causes of potential accidents, including terrorism.  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) licensing board accepted CP&L’s estimate without open examination or debate.

 The following is a list of issues publicized by NC WARN that relate to CP&L’s unexamined claim that the chance of a nuclear waste fire at Shearon Harris is remote.  Along with other specific problems brought forth by Orange County, why shouldn’t the public be concerned about these items?  If NC WARN has misinterpreted any item, we ask CP&L to  explain how. 

1. NEW STUDY OF WASTE POOL ACCIDENTS:  In January, the NRC released a multi-year study on nuclear waste cooling pools.  Among the findings: a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a waste pool fire in the US over the next 30 years, excluding the most troubling risk factor – terrorism – which could increase the probability of an accident by a factor of ten or more.

2. CP&L & NRC CONCEDE ON KEY ARGUMENTS:  In November, CP&L and NRC admitted their original argument about the Harris expansion was wrong, and that Orange County consultant Dr. Gordon Thompson is correct that waste over five years old will ignite if exposed to air – when packed in high-density racks as proposed by CP&L – because air cooling would be blocked by residual water under the assemblies.  Thompson’s analysis was incorporated as one of the most important risk factors in the January NRC study – after the agency had argued for 21 years that he was wrong. Both CP&L and the NRC now admit that a spent fuel fire at Harris would likely cause all pools to burn.

3. SECURITY BREACHES AT CP&L PLANTS:  In January, NC WARN learned of a two-level security lapse in 1999 which led to unauthorized employees gaining clearance to enter CP&L’s nuclear power plants.  Also revealed was a more serious security breach –  that a number of disqualified people worked at the Shearon Harris plant for more than a month in 1997 – including three who failed psychological exams and one with a criminal record .  Hundreds of temporary employees are brought in for refueling outages every 18 months at each plant; various federal agencies are increasingly warning about domestic terrorism; and nuclear plants have been shown to be highly vulnerable to intrusion, based on NRC’s own security program.

4. CP&L OVERPACKS WASTE POOLS:  In March, NC WARN learned that CP&L has loaded both pools at the Brunswick Nuclear Plant very near to, or beyond, the point where a full reactor core off-load could take place in the event of an emergency.   It plans to overload at its Robinson and Shearon Harris plants in the next few months if two new pools at Harris are not opened.

5. NRC RELIES ON FALSIFIED SAFETY STUDIES:  In September, the Union of Concerned Scientists reported that the NRC is increasing the likelihood of a serious nuclear accident by allowing utilities to falsify safety studies, thereby allowing the most dangerous nuclear plants to continue operating, and other plants to weaken safety requirements.

6. FREQUENT EMERGENCIES AT CP&L’S PLANTS:
· In March 2000, primary cooling of one of the Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant (located in North Carolina) reactors and waste pool was lost for nine hours during a refueling outage, and was compounded by failure of back-up diesel generators.  David Lochbaum of the Union of Concerend Scientists (UCS) says the plant “was on the path toward a major accident.”  If workers had been unable to restart the generators, and if the nine hours without primary cooling had been extended, a core meltdown could have ensued.

· In June 2000, a bearing failure in an emergency cooling pump at Shearon Harris resulted in a level two violation.  According to Lochbaum, “The bearing problem reduced the number of safety backups.  The reduction, while not fully eroding the safety margin, was troubling.”

· Two Fires at Brunswick in 2000:  In September, fire destroyed one of two main transformers at Brunswick, leading to automatic shutdown of one reactor.  In October, a pump motor caused another fire in a secured area.

· At least four emergency shutdowns of the Harris reactor since 1999 also indicate that human and technical errors do occur.
 

7. RECENT EMERGENCIES AT OTHER NUCLEAR PLANTS (partial listing):

· In December, the UCS discovered that the loss of waste pool cooling at plants in Iowa and Alabama went undetected for two days. The nuclear industry has long claimed this cannot happen.  Temperatures at one plant rose beyond levels associated with systems damage.

· In October, a four-inch crack in a primary cooling pipe at the VC Summer plant in South Carolina was discovered – only by sheer luck – before a rupture occurred which could well have exceeded the ability of backup cooling systems to prevent a meltdown.  One of the worst accidents considered possible at a nuclear power plant is a rupture of just such a “hot leg” pipe connected to the reactor vessel.

· In February 2000, a steam tube rupture at the Indian Point plant in NY released radioactive gases into the atmosphere and caused a regional alert to be declared for the first time in plant history.

· In October 2000, Duke Power Company reported an unplanned 20 minute release of radioactive gases into the atmosphere that exceeded radiation monitor limits at its Catawba plant.
 

8. COMBUSTIBLE FIRE WALL AT HARRIS:  In March 2001, the NRC met with CP&L about a fire wall which is crucial to the safety of the Shearon Harris nuclear reactor but is made of a combustible material – a problem Carolina Power & Light has known about for ten years.